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1. Introduction
This paper is about vagueness in natural language. More speciﬁcally, we discuss
lexical means of making vague assertions more or less precise. Examples of ex-
pressions that have this effect are approximately, absolutely, deﬁnitely, and roughly
speaking. While many of these expressions are modiﬁers and adverbs, some such
expressions are neither. Hence, for the purposes of this paper we call expressions
that make vague assertions more or less precise Approximators. Our main claim is
that the distribution of such expressions provides evidence for the view that vague-
ness in language comes in at least two varieties, which we call Scalar Vagueness
and Epistemic Vagueness.1
We assume that vagueness is characterized by giving rise to the Sorites-
Paradox. Consider the three examples in (1) through (3). In each case a Sorites-
Paradox reasoning goes through: If we accept the premise that “If Harry is bald,
it’s always true that, even if he had one more hair than he does, he would still be
bald.”, which sounds innocent, it follows that (1) does not tell us anything about
the number of hairs on Harry’s head. Similarly (2) would tell us how many grains
of sand there are in the heap if we accept the premise that “if something is a heap
of sand and we remove one grain from it, it is still a heap of sand.”. Finally, (3)
wouldn’t tell us anything about the time of John’s arrival if we accept the premise
that “if John arrived at 6 o’clock, then (3) would still be true if he arrived one second
later than he actually did.”
(1) Harry is bald.
(2) This is a heap of sand.
(3) John arrived at 6 o’clock.
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we refer to as scalar vagueness, but not completely so. For example, bald is usually regarded as
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also reﬂects that we regard both phenomena as a kind of vagueness.
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We contrast two views of vagueness: the monistic and the dualistic view.
The monistic view of vagueness, on the one hand, assumes that there is one general
mechanism of vagueness that underlies all phenomena exhibiting vagueness in nat-
ural langauge. Adherents to the uniform view do not all agree on what the general
mechanism of vagueness is, but they agree that there is just one mechanism. For
instance, the following treatments of vagueness advocate a uniform view: Lakoff
(1973), who analyses all forms of vagueness using fuzzy logic, Kamp (1981), who
uses supervaluations, Lasersohn (1999), who proposes “Pragmatic Halos” for all
forms of vagueness, and to some extent also the epistemic view of vagueness of
Williamson (1994). The dualistic view, on the other hand, assumes that there are
at least two mechanisms that can give rise to vagueness. Adherents to the dual-
istic view like Pinkal (1995), and Kennedy (2007) have, as far as we are aware
of, generally distinguished between (2) and (3). Intuitively, the distinction is that
there seems to be no precise concept of heap, while there is a precise concept of 6
o’clock, a point in time. However, the expression 6 o’clock does not refer to this
precise concept, but rather a broader, vague one. This intuitive distinction by itself,
however, would not require two different accounts of vagueness in language. Fur-
thermore, there are cases where the intuitive distinction is drawn in varied ways:
Existing work that advocates the dualistic view does not say where expressions like
bald in (1) are classiﬁed. Bald is generally considered a core case of vagueness in
language and is often used to exemplify the concept (for instance, by Kamp 1981
and Williamson 2000: 102), but it also is intuitively related to a precise concept—
that of having no hair whatsoever on the scalp. The evidence from approximators
we discuss in this paper not only provides new evidence for the dualistic view,
but also gives us a way of classifying vague expressions into one type or another.
Speciﬁcally, we argue below that bald exhibits scalar vagueness.
2. Initial Support for the Dualistic Theory: Distributional Differences
Between Approximators
The example in (4) illustrates that approximators have a limited distribution: while
exactly and approximately easily combine with ﬁfty, they are unacceptable with
heap, as in (4b):
(4) a. What John cooked was exactly/approximately ﬁfty tapas.
b. #What John cooked was exactly/approximately Beef Stroganoff.
The contrast in (4) between different vague expressions is unexpected from the
point of view of the monist theory of vagueness. Speciﬁcally, this point is shown
below for the analysis of Lasersohn (1999), which is the only monist analysis we are
aware of that provides an account of some approximators. On our dualist account,
however, the difference between ﬁve and Beef Stroganoff follows from that between
scalar and epistemic vagueness.
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There are also differences between approximators. Consider for example,
the expressions deﬁnitely and maybe. They can be used to express approximation:
For example, (5) when used while we are eating the dish John cooked.2
(5) What John cooked is deﬁnitely/maybe Beef Stroganoff.
We take these distributional differences to suggest that there are two groups of ap-
proximators: scalar approximators and epistemic approximators. The two classes
correspond to the two kinds of vagueness, scalar and epistemic vagueness.3
There are several other approximators that we consider in detail below.
Speciﬁcally, we further distinguish between two kinds of approximators in the
scalar domain: For instance, absolutely, completely, and totally are more or less
in complementary distribution with exactly. We show below that exactly is used
when the associated scalar expression denotes a mid-point of a scale while abso-
lutely, completely, and totally are used only with endpoints (Kennedy and McNally
2005).
(6) a. *What John cooked was absolutely/completely/totally ﬁfty tapas.
b. What John cooked was absolutely/completely/totally appropriate.
For the English examples, it is necessary to mention on further property of
exactly right away. In the scope of negation exactly can combine with any kind of
predicate and in that respect patterns with the epistemic approximators.
(7) Red wine isn’t exactly healthy.
This seems to cast doubt on the validity of the argument for distinguishing among
kinds of vagueness. But, there are two reasons to believe that (7) does not threaten
the suggested classiﬁcation. For one, consider the German and Bulgarian counter-
parts of exactly. In (8a) and (9a) these are literal translations of English exactly.
But, unlike English exactly, both Bulgarian tocˇno in (8b) and German genau in (9b)
are not acceptable with epistemically vague predicates in negative contexts.
(8) a. cˇervenoto
red-the
vino
wine
e
is
tocˇno
exactly
trigodisno.
three-year-old
b. #cˇervenoto
red-the
vino
wine
ne
is
e
not
tocˇno
exactly
zdravoslovno
healthy
2In such contexts, it is the rather the meaning of the phrase Beef Stroganoff that is discussed,
rather than the ingredients and method of preparation of the dish in front of us (Barker 2002).
3Epistemic approximators can also be used with expressions that are scalar vague as in (i). A
purely approximating interpretation of (i) is available, though only in scenarios like the following:
John volunteered to cook ﬁfty tapas. He cooked a lot, but it were exactly fourtynine tapas. Now we
are discussing whether John honored the contract. If I believe that John’s orginal utterance ‘I will
make ﬁfty tapas’ implied only that we would make about ﬁfty, I could use (i) to state my believe.
Note though that this meaning is still quite different from exactly ﬁfty.
(i) The number of tapas John cooked is deﬁnitely ﬁfty.
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(9) a. Der
the
Rotwein
red-wine
ist
is
genau
exactly
drei
three
Jahre
years
alt.
old
b. #Der
the
Rotwein
red-wine
is
is
nicht
not
genau
exactly
gesund.
healthy
In addition, even precisely, which is a near-equivalent of exactly in English, does
not pattern with it:
(10) #Red wine isn’t precisely healthy.
We conclude then that English has a second lexical entry for exactly, which is a
strong negative polarity item and an epistemic approximator, and leave it aside in
the following.
A further case, where a scalar approximator can be combined with an epis-
temically vague expressions is that of not even approximately healthy as in (11).
These examples can be translated literally into German and Bulgarian, and hence
we have no evidence that we are looking at a separate lexical entry for approxi-
mately in (11). Nevertheless, this ambiguity analysis presently still seems to be the
simplest analysis for (11) to us.
(11) a. Red wine isn’t even approximately healthy.
b. What John cooked isn’t even approximately Beef Stroganoff.
3. Proposal
The dualistic theory of vagueness that we advocate is based on the observation that
markers of approximation come in two classes depending on the kind of vagueness
they make more precise or more vague. Vague predicates, we suggest, should be
described as scalarly or epistemically vague.
3.1. Scalar Vagueness
The ﬁrst kind of vagueness can only be related to expressions that denote a point on
a scale. Numerals can serve as a prototypical example. We have already mentioned
in Section 1 above that numerals allow for an interpretation that is consistent with a
larger segment of the scale: they can denote an interval (Krifka 2007). For example,
the expression 5 meters could, in a given context, be a good description of the length
of a rod the actual length of which we believe to lie somewhere in the interval
between 4.5m and 5.5m. In this example, the scale is partitioned in segments of
1m.
Following Krifka (2007), we assume the model for the alignment of point-
denoting scalar terms with granularity intervals of a scale that is illustrated by ﬁgure
1. A scale can be simultaneously divided up into intervals of varying granularity.
In principle, each point-denoting term is a candidate for denoting any intervals that
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"4.50" "5.50"
5m4m 6m
"3.50" "6.50"
"5 meters""4 meters"ers" "7 m
Figure 1: Alignment of length terms with scale intervals
contains this point. However, general pragmatic principles entail that the shortest
expression must be used for each interval.4 This yields the alignment of terms and
scale intervals shown in ﬁgure 1. For instance, 5 meters denotes the interval from
4.50 to 5.50 at the 1m granularity, while 4 meter 50 and 4 meter 90 are blocked from
denoting this interval because they are longer expressions than 5 meters. Instead,
4 meter 50 denotes an interval at the half-meter granularity, and 4 meter 90 at the
10cm interval granularity. The grey intervals in ﬁgure 1 are not denoted by any
expression of the form x meters y because the shortest expressions denoting a point
in these intervals already denote a larger interval.
3.2. Granularity Functions
We propose that granularity is a contextual parameter of interpretation. Formally,
we assume that a granularity function maps each point of a scale to an interval
that contains it. Here are examples of different extensions of 5 meters which vary
because of a different setting of scale granularity:
(12) a. granﬁne(5m) = [4.95m, . . . , 5.00m, . . . , 5.05m]
b. granmid(5m) = [4.75m, . . . , . . . , 5.00m, . . . , . . . , 5.25m]
c. grancoarse(5m) = [4.50m, . . . , . . . , . . . , 5.00, . . . , . . . , . . . , 5.50m]
Normally, several granularities are under consideration simultaneously, and hence
the gran parameter of interpretation contains more than one granularity function.
When a scalar point expression is evaluated, it is mapped by the coarsest granularity
such that the expression is the shortest expression that could denote the resulting
interval. Hence, we end up with the mapping in (13).
(13) a. [[5 meters]]gran = grancoarse(5m) = [4.50m, 5.50m]
b. [[4 meters 50]]gran = granmid(4.5m) = [4.25m, 4.75m]
c. [[4 meters 90]]gran = granﬁnest(4.9m) = [4.85m, 4.95m]
Our approach also applies to non-numeral expressions like the middle. We
assume that, if A is actually the center of the circle, the denotations of the middle
for different granularity functions could be the following:
4Krifka shows that in some cases other considerations of cognitive efﬁciency override the use of
the shortest expressions. For example, 18 months denotes a bigger interval when describing a childs
age than twenty months.
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(14) [[the middle of the circle around A]]
a. granﬁnest(S)(A) = the 1mm circle surrounding A
b. granmed(S)(A) = the 1cm circle surrounding A
c. grancoarse(S)(A) = the 2cm circle surrounding A
Our principles need to be generalized to many other scales. We assume
for closed scales the following deﬁnitions for granularity function and the notions
ﬁner/coarser: A granularity function γ for scale S has the following properties:
(15) a. ∀s ∈ S : s ∈ γ(s)
b. ∀s ∈ S : γ(s) is convex
c. ∀s,s′ ∈ S : max(γ(s))−min(γ(s)) = max(γ(s′))−min(γ(s′))
A granularity function γ is ﬁner (or coarser when < is replaced by >) than γ ′ if:
(16) ∀s ∈ S : max(γ(s))−min(γ(s)) < max(γ ′(s))−min(γ ′(s))
These deﬁnitions will be sufﬁcient for our purposes in this paper. Ultimately,
though, it would be desirable to extend the approach to open scales, which Hobbs
and Kreinovich (2006) argue have logarithmic granularity.
3.3. Scalar Approximators
Under this view, what is the role of scalar approximators? Let us go back to an
example from the introduction (repeated from 4):
(17) What John cooked was approximately/exactly ﬁfty tapas.
We propose that scalar approximators reset the granularity parameter to the coars-
est granularity. For this reset, the following new composition principle is needed
(assuming the general framework of composition of Heim and Kratzer 1998):
(18) Granularity modifying composition: If [[A]]Γ has in its domain functions that
take sets of granularity functions as arguments, then the new composition
rule [[A B]]Γ = [[A]]Γ (λΓ′ [[B]]Γ′) must be applied.
The lexical entries for approximately and exactly can then be given as in (19). Both
set the granularity parameter for the evaluation of their complement to a singleton
set; exactly to the ﬁnest and approximately to the coarsest granularity.
(19) a. [[exactly]]gran(G) = G({ﬁnest(gran)})
b. [[approximately]]gran(G) = G({coarsest(gran)})
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This approach predicts that the use of exactly makes it possible to denote
some of the grey intervals in ﬁgure 1. For instance, exactly ﬁve meters denotes
the interval from 4.95m to 5.05m in a context where exactly the three granularities
drawn in 1 are under consideration.
Our account also predicts the oddity of (20) in a general context: On the
coarsest scale, 49 and 50 belong to the same interval. But then, 50 must be used
over 49 to denote this interval.
(20) #What John cooked was approximately 49 tapas.
We give lexical entries for other scalar approximators in Section 4 below, and also
discuss the restriction to midpoints of exactly and approximately. We argue there
that at least the following expressions belong to this class:
(21) a. Scalar more precise approximators: Exactly, absolutely, completely,
precisely, perfectly
b. Scalar less precise approximators: approximately, about, partially, suf-
ﬁciently, roughly.
3.4. Epistemic Vagueness and Approximators
We observed above that expressions like deﬁnitely and maybe can be used as ap-
proximators. In contrast to scalar approximators, they can combine with any predi-
cate that does not have a precise meaning or at least it is not known. For such pred-
icates we use the term epistemically vague (cf. Bosch 1983, Williamson 1994). We
propose that epistemically vague predicates differ in their extensions even across
worlds where physical object properties (i.e. the number of sand grains in a heap)
do not differ. Let us take heap as a prototypical example of an epistemically vague
predicate. As illustrated in (22), we assume that the minimum amount of sand that
constitutes a heap can differ: the extension of heap may include in a possible world
w1 any pile of more than 20 grains, but in a possible world w2 it may include only
objects consisting of more than 30 grains even though the two worlds are indistin-
guishable in terms of the location and size of objects.
(22) heap(w1) = 〈twenty grains, twenty-one grains, . . . 〉,
heap(w1) = 〈thirty grains, thirty one grains, . . . 〉
This approach predicts that epistemic approximation arises as a side effect
of general epistemic quantiﬁcation. Since the epistemic approximators also all have
general epistemic uses, this is a desirable result. Approximation is most clearly
intended when there is no other uncertainty:5
5Makoto Kanazawa (p.c.) points out that also example (i) brings about an approximation inter-
pretation and that furthermore there is an interesting contrast between (i) and (ii). The contrast is
explained if a felicitous use of the heap requires that in all worlds of the common ground there must
be a salient referent for it, and furthermore presupposes that they are satisﬁed if evaluated against
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(23) This perfectly cone-shaped pile of 17 sand-grains on the table in front of us
is maybe/deﬁnitely a heap.
We hence assume that maybe and deﬁnitely express existential and universal epis-
temic quantiﬁcation respectively and that the effect of approximation is a conse-
quence of this use. We think that this approach should also be extended to other
epistemic approximators, such as the following:6
(24) a. Epistemic more certain approximators: deﬁnitely, positively, for sure,
certainly
b. Epistemic less certain approximators: more or less, maybe, -ish
English epistemic modals also can be used as approximators, but since they
have an evidential component requiring indirect evidence (von Fintel and Gillies
2006), this requires a special context. For example, (25) could be used by me in a
context where I just heard a third person, who speaks English natively, refer to the
sand-accumulation in front of me as a heap:
(25) This cone-shaped pile of 17 sand-grains must be a heap.
3.5. Combinatorics: Further Support for the Dualistic View
Stacking approximators provides further support for the dualistic view. Our theory
predicts that scalar approximators could not be stacked for the following reasons:
Recall we suggested that these approximators restrict the granularity parameter of
their complement to one granularity function. A second scalar approximator in the
scope of the ﬁrst is vacuous. The facts, as we see in (26) and (26), coincide with
the predictions.
(26) a. #John is exactly/precisely approximately 30.
b. #John is approximately exactly/precisely 30.
the common ground.
(i) This heap is deﬁnitely a heap.
(ii) #This heap is maybe not a heap.
6Gillian Ramchand (p.c.) points out that in some dialects of British English ish can be used
not just as an afﬁx as in greyish or Beef Stroganofﬁsh, but also as a independent sentence ﬁnal
morpheme. A Linguist List post by Margaret Fleck from February 1992 points out the following
example (http://linguistlist.org/issues/3/3-129.html):
(i) A: Is your algorithm working?
B: Yes, it’s working. Ish.
The afﬁx -erly seems restricted to compass direction as in northerly vs. northern. Judging from
the data reported in Siegel (2002), English like behaves also like an epistemic approximator
in that it is not restricted to scalar predicates. Geoff Pullum, in a November 22, 2003 Lan-
guage Log internet post, points out that if you will is similar in distribution and meaning to like
(http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/%7Emyl/languagelog/archives/000138.html).
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The monistic account of Lasersohn (1999), which addresses some approxi-
mators, makes different predictions for (26):7 Lasersohn (1999) represents vague-
ness uniformly as a Halo of values close enough to the truth to be considered true,
but not really true. For example, the halo of 30 in a given context could be the set
of all points representing real numbers between 29.5 and 30.5. In the diagrams (27)
through (30) truth is indicated by black, the Halo area by grey, and falsity by white.
(27) ‘30’: 30 312928 32 3327
In this theory exactly narrows the halo. Because of this function, Lasersohn calls it
a slack regulator.
(28) ‘exactly 30’: 30 312928 32 3327
As a less precise approximator, Lasersohn discusses only loosely speaking. We
assume, approximately would receive the same analysis: It makes the predicate
actually true of for all the values otherwise only in its halo:
(29) ‘approximately 30’: 30 312928 32 3327
Lasersohn’s analysis correctly predicts (26a) to be odd because approxi-
mately 30 has no halo that could be narrowed. However, (26b) is predicted to be
without blemish by Lasersohn’s analysis: As (30) shows, the resulting predicate
should be true of values in its narrowed halo.
(30) ‘approximately exactly 30’: 30 312928 32 3327
We therefore conclude that the halo theory cannot account for the distribution of
approximators correctly.
4. Subclasses of Scalar Approximators
4.1. Distribution with Adjectives
Our main claim in this section is that the scalar approximators should be divided
into two subclasses: those that combine with endpoints of a scale, and those that
combine with non-endpoints of a scale. Absolutely is an example of an approxi-
mator that makes the endpoint more precise, while exactly is an approximator that
makes non-endpoints more precise. This claim can be examined by combining
approximators with adjectives in English for the following reason: Rotstein and
7Lasersohn’s (1999) paper does not address negation at all. In our view, negation is problematic
for Lasersohn’s ‘Halo Theory’, but other monist accounts do not suffer from this problem. The
differences between approximators with regard to stacking and other phenomena, however, are a
problem for all monistic theories.
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Winter (2004) and Kennedy and McNally (2005) argue that the scales associated
with adjectives can be either open or closed, and that this affects the denotation
of adjectives. Speciﬁcally, adjectives associated with closed scales denote the end-
points of the scale, while those associated with open scales cannot denote endpoints.
Hence, our proposal predicts, on the one hand, that the endpoint-associated approx-
imators should combine only with the closed scale adjectives. Following Kennedy
and McNally (2005), we explain the distribution of absolutely in (31) on this ba-
sis. Approximators like exactly, which are not restricted to endpoints, on the other
hand, can also only combine with point-denoting scalar expressions. The semantics
we gave in (19) above for exactly initially predicts that it can combine with any
point-denoting scalar expression. But, we expect furthermore that exactly should
be blocked whenever a more specialized expression such as absolutely is applica-
ble. Therefore exactly is expected to combine only with expressions that denote
non-endpoints on a scale. In this way, we explain the distribution of exactly in (31).
(31) a. The glass is absolutely/#exactly full.
b. The glass is exactly/#absolutely half full.
Intuitions on the use of approximators are sometimes ﬂeeting. For instance,
(31a) with exactly improves after pondering it for a while. We think this is due to
some coercion of the scale structure where full does not denote an endpoint. This
is supported by an intuition that Chris Tancredi (p.c.) pointed out to us: exactly full
could be used to describe a glass in which the liquid is exactly level and aligned
with the upper rim of the glass; absolutely full though could be used to describe a
glass where the surface of the liquid it contains is bulging upwards higher than the
brim of the glass.
To circumvent the effect of scalar coercion, we also tested our distributional
claims with a corpus study using the British National Corpus (BNC). The result
of this study is reported in ﬁgure 2. We measured how frequent an approximator-
adjective sequence occurs relative to the individual frequency of approximator and
adjective. The numbers we report in (32) are such that if approximator and ad-
jective were randomly distributed in the corpus, the value 1 should appear.8 The
columns of the table each show for each approximator that number of individual
occurrences in the corpus altogether in the second row. Beginning from the third
row, a relative frequency scores is shown for speciﬁc scalar expressions. This value
is calculated according to the formular at the bottom of the diagram: the number of
occurrences of the string of approximator followed by the scalar expression divided
by the number of individual occurrences of each word. The rows contain for each
of the adjectives we looked at, the number of individual occurrences in the ﬁrst
column and the frequency scores for each approximator in the following columns.
8Technically, the value reported for a random distribution should be close to 1, but not necessarily
exactly 1.
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The results for the most part conﬁrm our expectations. We have marked
the unexpectedly high values with a surrounding line. We did not mark unexpected
0 values since we assume that the corpus is too small to conclude anything from
these. The three most notable departures from our predictions are the frequencies
of approximately true, exactly right, and exactly satisfactory. We assume that each
of these is explained by reference to a coerced scale structure, but two different pro-
cesses of coercion are at work. For exactly satisfactory, we think that a scale where
satisfactory denotes a non-endpoint between unsatisfactory and great is available.
For right and true, we assume that the scale of truth can be adjusted to have truth
as a midpoint between two poles of falsity as shown in (32).
(32) false true false
We assume that the scale in (32) is available when the truth of an non-
endpoint answer to a scalar question asking is relevant. Hence we expect the con-
trast in (33):
(33) a. A: How tall is Chris?
B: 190 cm.
A: You’re exactly right./That’s approximately true.
b. A: How dry do you think the shirt is?
B: It should be dry by now.
A: #You are exactly right.
4.2. More Precise Scalar Approximators
Before looking at other approximators, recall again the distribution of exactly as
shown in (34): It cannot combine with the endpoint denoting scalar expressions in
(34a). With the non-endpoint denoting scalar expressions in (34b), however, exactly
is ﬁne. These include numerals, time descriptions, spatial boundaries, same, and
equatives. Finally, non-NPI exactly cannot combine with the non-scalar expressions
in (34c).
(34) a. #exactly dry/pure/full/empty/white
b. exactly three/?north/the same
c. #exactly Beef Stroganoff/a heap of wood
Our lexical entry for exactly in (19) at this point only explains the restriction of ex-
actly to scalar vague terms: because granularity is not made use of by these predi-
cates, exactly is vacuous. The restriction to non-endpoints we assume follows from
the fact that there are expressions like absolutely and completely that speciﬁcally
make the endpoints more precise.
For the semantic entries of further approximators we adopt the convention
that d be the type of degrees. We assume furthermore that adjectives are of the type
〈〈d, t〉,〈e, t〉. For example, for dry we assume the lexical entry in (35).
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(35) [[dry]]w,gran = λ I ∈ D〈d,t〉 λx ∈ De . I holds of the degree to which x is dry
Absolutely, completely, and totally are all three in complementary distri-
bution with exactly in the scalar domain. As Kennedy and McNally (2005) have
already observed, completely can combine only with predicates which denote end-
points of a scale in (36a). It does not combine with non-endpoints in (36b) or with
epistemically vague expressions in (36c). The distribution of absolutely and totally
is very similar to that of completely as far as we can tell, and in the following we
only talk about completely.9
(36) a. completely dry/pure/white
b. #completely three/north/the same
c. #completely Beef Stroganoff/a heap of wood
The lexical entry in (37) is similar in spirit to Kennedy and McNally’s (2005)
suggestion, but it makes reference to the function of the modiﬁers as granularity
setters.
(37) [[completely]]gran = λ f ∈ D〈dt,et〉 λx ∈ De
∃D ∈ Ddt [D = ﬁnest(gran)(max(domain( f ))) & f (D)(x)]
This entry takes an adjective as argument and returns a property. Hence, the lexical
entry explains why completely must be adjacent to the scalar expression it associates
from exactly as shown by (38). Since it makes reference to the endpoint, (37)
furthermore explains why completely requires closed scales.
(38) a. Mary arrived (*completely) with (completely) dry shirts.
b. Mary arrived (exactly) at (exactly) noon.
Precisely has a distribution similar to that of exactly, but is preferably com-
bined with anaphoric expressions denoting non-end points of a scale, as illustrated
in (39). At present, we assume that precisely has the same lexical entry as exactly
in (19).
(39) a. #precisely dry/pure/full/empty/white
b. ?precisely three/that amount/#north/there
c. #precisely Beef Stroganoff/a heap of wood
Perfectly also belongs to this group of scalar approximators, and its meaning
and distribution is closely related to that of completely:
(40) a. perfectly dry/straight/clean/safe/appropriate/possible
#perfectly full/empty/white
b. #perfectly three/north
9We have to put aside for now, though, uses of absolutely with quantiﬁers like every and no.
Furthermore, absolutely can combine with zero, while completely and totally cannot.
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c. #perfectly Beef Stroganoff/a heap
Perfectly has, however, an intensional component. Intuitively, an expression like
perfectly dry makes reference to a desired point of dryness.10 Given that, it should
be analyzed in a way similar to modal superlatives like the driest possible. Building
on this intuition, we can suggest a lexical entry for perfectly that follows closely, in
the relevant respect, Schwarz’s (2006) deﬁnition of the modal superlative operator
-est-possible. We assume that like -est-possible, perfectly moves to take sentential
scope. It leaves behind a trace of the type 〈d, t〉, and combines with the lambda-
abstract created by movement. The lexical entry for perfectly in (41) applied to
The shirt is perfectly dry can be paraphrased as: The shirt is completely dry and
complete dryness of the shirt is desirable.
(41) [[perfectly]]w,gran = λR ∈ D〈dt,st〉 ∀w′ ∈ Ds ∃D ∈ D〈d,t〉 [Accw(w′) &
D = ﬁnest(gran)(max(domain(R))) & R(D)(w) = 1 & R(D)(w′) = 1]
The similarity in meaning between modal superlatives and perfectly ex-
plains the oddity of (42):
(42) #The shirt is completely driest possible.
4.3. Less Precise Scalar Approximators
Approximately clearly patterns with exactly in its distribution. It, too, combines
only with scalar expressions not associated with endpoints as shown in (43).
(43) a. #approximately dry/pure/white
b. approximately three/north/the same
c. #approximately Beef Stroganoff/a heap of wood
The lexical entry in (19) explains why the use of approximately with epistemically
vague expressions is blocked in the same way as for exactly. For the restriction to
endpoints, we claim that the use of approximately is blocked by more or less, just
as exactly was blocked by completely.
More or less we analyze as the counterpart of completely, making reference
to the coarsest granularity that combines with endpoints as shown in (44).11
(44) a. more or less dry/pure/white
b. #more or less three/north
c. #more or less Beef Stroganoff/a heap of wood
Our lexical entry for more or less is given in (45):12
10EricMcCready (p.c.) points out uses like perfectly awful and perfectly horrible where perfection
is not related to desirability. We put these cases aside for now.
11One exception to the complementarity of approximately and more or less is more or less the
same. We put this aside for now.
12As in the case of absolutely, we restrict ourselves here to uses of more or less with adjectives.
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(45) [[more or less]]gran = λ f ∈ D〈dt,et〉 λx ∈ De
∃D ∈ Ddt [D = coarsest(gran)(max(domain( f ))) & f (D)(x)]
Note that more or less must be adjacent to the scalar expression it is construed with
again, as is the case with completely.
(46) John arrived (#more or less) with (more or less) clean clothes.
Pretty has a use that is in many ways similar to more or less, but we still
need to investigate it in more detail.
About is similar to approximately but can only be construed with numerals
and temporal expressions as shown in (47).
(47) a. about three, at about noon, at about midnight, at about the same time
b. #about clean/open/north
We assume that about directly applies the coarsest granularity function to its com-
plement. This results in the same semantic effect as does approximately, though the
mechanism is slightly different. We assume that approximately is not blocked by
about because the resulting interpretation is identical.
(48) [[about D]]gran = coarsest(gran)([[D]])
Some, weak disjunction, and approximative inversion in Russian are scalar
approximators that can only be construed with numerals. (49a) illustrates the use
of some we refer to, while (49b) illustrates what we call weak disjunction because
the disjunction or must be unstressed for the approximator interpretation.
(49) a. some ﬁfteen boys
b. He is gone for two or three days.
In German, the equivalent of weak disjunction does not involve disjunction at all as
illustrated in (50).
(50) Er
he
ist
is
fu¨r
for
zwei
two
drei
three
Tage
days
weg.
gone
Approximative inversion in Russian is illustrated by (51a). The postnominal posi-
tion of the cardinal indicates that an approximative interpretation is intended.
(51) a. Ja
I
vstretil
met
studentov
students
desjat’.
ten
‘I met approximately 10 students’
b. Ja vstretil desjat’ studentov
I met ten students
‘I met ten students’
242 Uli Sauerland and Penka Stateva
We assume that all these approximators involve the same lexical entry as the one we
gave for about. This is shown for approximative some in (52). For approximative
inversion and weak disjunction we assume that the construction licenses a silent
counterpart of approximative some.
(52) [[some D]]gran = coarsest(gran)[[D]]
Partially has the same distribution as completely and more or less: As
Kennedy and McNally (2005) have already observed, it can combine with predi-
cates that introduce closed scales:13
(53) a. partially dry/pure/empty
b. #partially impure/three/north/white
c. #partially Beef Stroganoff/a heap of wood
We perceive partially open to be equivalent to not completely closed. This follows
from the lexical entry for partially in (54):
(54) [[partially]]gran = λ f ∈ D〈dt,et〉 λx ∈ De
∃D ∈ Ddt [D = ﬁnest(gran)(min(domain( f ))) & ¬ f (D)(x)]
4.4. Further Potential Scalar Approximators
The framework we develop for approximative modiﬁers calls for some discussion
of almost, nearly, and barely. While we think that the analysis of these expressions
also needs to make appeal to granularity, we do not have a fully worked out proposal
to offer at this point. Brieﬂy consider almost. It seems that almost does involve
scales, but often the scale can be a derived temporal scale as the examples (55a)
and (56a) illustrate (cf. Rapp and von Stechow 1996, Penka 2006). Approximately
in (55b) and (56b) and the other scalar approximators we talked about above seem
to be unable to access this scale.
(55) a. John almost killed Harry. (with intended interpretation: John might
have killed Harry.)
b. #John approximately killed Harry.
(56) a. Charles is almost King by now. (with intended interpretation: Charles
will be King soon.)
b. #Charles is approximately King by now.
In examples like (57), however, we can readily analyze almost as making
reference to the interval one below the maximum on the coarsest granularity. To
write out this lexical entry for almost in (57), we use the notation prevgran(D) to
denote the granularity interval on the scale of D that precedes D.
13Manfred Bierwisch (p.c.) points out that the German counterpart of partially, ‘teilweise’, must
always receive a mereological interpretation. A door that is ‘teilweise’ open, must be a door that
consists out of at least two independently movable pieces, only one of which is open.
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(57) The shirt is almost dry.
(58) [[almost]]gran = λ f ∈ D〈dt,et〉 λx ∈ De
∃D ∈ Ddt [D = coarsest(gran)(max(domain( f ))) & f (prevgran(D))(x)]
The examples in (59) show that other scalar approximators can themselves
be modiﬁed by almost. In this case, it seems that the resulting interpretation makes
reference to the interval one below the maximum on the ﬁnest granularity.
(59) The shirt was almost perfectly/completely dry.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we argued for the necessity to distinguish between two kinds of vague-
ness, scalar and epistemic. We based this conclusion on a study of the semantic
and distributional properties of approximators like exactly, completely, deﬁnitely,
approximately, more or less, and maybe. One kind of vagueness relates precise
expressions to intervals: We argued for a granularity parameter that regulates with
which interval expressions like ﬁve o’clock that denote points on a scale are as-
sociated. Scalar approximators like exactly, completely, approximately, and more
or less regulate the size of the granularity intervals. We argued in Section 4, that
the scalar approximators are further subdivided into endpoint and non-endpoint ori-
ented ones. The other kind of vagueness is genuinely epistemic, and epistemic
expressions like deﬁnitely and maybe regulate this kind of vagueness.
One surprising result of our work is that heap and bald, two often cited
examples of vague predicates, actually belong to two different classes of vague
expressions: Heap is epistemically vague, while bald must be scalarly vague since
it combines with the scalar approximators completely and more or less.
There are a number of things we had to put aside for reasons of space and
time in this paper. This includes the analysis of the wider distribution not exactly,
which as we noted is a phenomenon restricted to English, and of not even approx-
imately. Furthermore, we did not actually provide an analysis of the approximator
loosely speaking. This is one case that Lasersohn (1999) discusses, but his analysis
is incompatible with our framework for the analysis of vagueness. Therefore, we
are under an obligation to provide an alternative analysis, however, this is beyond
the scope of the present paper for the reason that we believe that loosely speaking is
speech-act oriented. One reason for this assumption is provided by the data in (60):
Embedded under a speech-act verb in (60a), loosely speaking is part of the content
of the embedded clause and interpreted from John’s perspective. But, embedded
under the non-speech-act verb think in (60b), loosely speaking is interpreted from
the speakers perspective and not part of the content of the embedded clause.
(60) a. John said that, loosely speaking, a heap of sand is on his table.
b. John thinks that, loosely speaking, a heap of sand is on his table.
244 Uli Sauerland and Penka Stateva
References
Barker, Chris: 2002, ‘The dynamics of vagueness’, Linguistics and Philosophy 25,
1–36.
Bosch, Peter: 1983, “‘Vagueness” is context-dependence. A solution to the Sorites
paradox’, in T. T. Ballmer and M. Pinkal (eds.), Approaching Vagueness,
189–210. North Holland, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
von Fintel, Kai and Antony S. Gillies: 2006, ‘Epistemic modality for dummies’.
MIT and Michigan.
Heim, Irene and Angelika Kratzer: 1998, Semantics in Generative Grammar.
Blackwell, Oxford, UK.
Hobbs, Jerry and Vladik Kreinovich: 2006, ‘Optimal coice of granularity in
commonsense estimation: Why half-orders of magnitude’. unpublished
manuscript.
Kamp, Hans: 1981, ‘The paradox of the heap’, in U. Mo¨nnich (ed.), Aspects of
Philosophical Logic: Some Logical Forays into Central Notions of Linguis-
tics and Philosophy, 225–277. Reidel, Dordrecht.
Kennedy, Christopher: 2007, ‘Vagueness and grammar: the semantics of relative
and absolute gradable adjectives’, Linguistics and Philosophy 30, 1–45.
Kennedy, Christopher and Louise McNally: 2005, ‘Scale structure and the semantic
typology of gradable predicates’, Language 81.
Krifka, Manfred: 2007, ‘Approximate interpretation of number words: A case for
strategic communication’, in G. Bouma, I. Kra¨mer, and J. Zwarts (eds.),
Cognitive Foundations of Communication, 111–126. Koninklijke Neder-
landse Akademie van Wetenschapen.
Lakoff, George: 1973, ‘Hedges’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 2, 458–508.
Lasersohn, Peter: 1999, ‘Pragmatic halos’, Language 75, 522–551.
Penka, Doris: 2006, ‘Almost there: The meaning of almost’, in Proceedings of SuB
10. Berlin.
Pinkal, Manfred: 1995, Logic and the Lexicon. Kluwer, Dordrecht, Netherlands.
Rapp, Irene and Arnim von Stechow: 1996, ‘Fast ‘almost’ and the visibility param-
eter for D-adverbs’, Journal of Semantics.
Rotstein, Carmen and Yoad Winter: 2004, ‘Total adjectives vs. partial adjectives:
Scale structure and higher-order modiﬁers’, Natural Language Semantics
12, 259–288.
Schwarz, Bernhard: 2006, ‘Modal superlatives’, in Proceedings of SALT 15. CLC
Publications, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
Siegel, Muffy: 2002, ‘Like: The discourse particle and semantics’, Journal of Se-
mantics 19, 35–71.
Williamson, Timothy: 1994, Vagueness. Routledge, London, UK.
Williamson, Timothy: 2000, Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, UK.
Scalar vs. Epistemic Vagueness: Evidence from Approximators 245
